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Elder Law

[02/05] Villano v. Waterman Convalescent Hosp., Inc.
In plaintiff's action against a convalescent hospital claiming she was admitted without her consent, judgment of the trial court is affirmed where, although a stipulated judgment is appealable, plaintiff cannot show that allegedly erroneous rulings were prejudicial.

[12/22] Massey v. Mercy Med. Center Redding
In plaintiff's negligence action against a nurse and the hospital that employed the nurse alleging that he sustained injury after falling from a walker because the nurse placed the plaintiff on the walker and left him unattended, judgment of the trial court is reversed in part where: 1) the question of nurse's alleged negligence for the fall poses a question of common knowledge, and therefore does not require expert opinion testimony; and 2) trial court's judgment that denied plaintiff's attempt to amend his complaint to add causes of action for battery, fraud and elder abuse is affirmed.

[12/21] Grace Healthcare of Benton v. US Dept. of Health & Hum. Servs.
In a petition for review of a civil monetary penalty imposed by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services on petitioner nursing home for an "immediate jeopardy" violation of 42 C.F.R. section 483.13(c), which required nursing homes to thoroughly investigate all allegations of resident neglect or abuse, including injuries of unknown sources, the petition is granted where the Secretary's finding of the likely harm necessary to warrant an immediate-jeopardy-level finding was based on pure speculation and not supported by substantial evidence in the administrative record as a whole.

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Dispute Resolution & Arbitration

[03/09] San Francisco Hous. Auth. v. SEIU Local 790
Superior court's order vacating an arbitration award in its entirety on the ground that the the award is contrary to layoff provisions of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the parties is reversed as the remedy imposed by the arbitrator did not conflict with clear and explicit language of the MOU and it was rationally related to the breach identified.

[03/04] Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm.
In a telecommunications company's appeal from (1) the district court's confirmation of an arbitral order affirming the California Public Utilities Commission's (CPUC) requirement that plaintiff lease entrance facilities to competitor local exchange carriers (LECs) at Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC) rates for the purpose of interconnection; and (2) the district court's order vacating the arbitrator's affirmance of CPUC's conclusion that 47 C.F.R. section 51.319(e)(2)(ii)(B) applied only on routes where competitive LECs were not "impaired" as to DS3 transport circuits, the orders are affirmed where: 1) FCC regulations authorized state public utilities commissions to order incumbent LECs to lease entrance facilities to competitive LECs at regulated rates for the purpose of interconnection; and 2) the plain language of the governing regulation, 47 C.F.R. section 51.319(e (2)(ii)(B), limited a competitive LEC to a maximum of ten DS1 circuits along any route regardless of whether the competitive LEC was impaired as to DS3 lines.

[03/01] Powershare, Inc. v. Syntel, Inc.
In parties' action for breach of a business agreement, a district court's denial of defendant's motion to stay litigation pending arbitration is reversed where: 1) the agreement contains a mandatory arbitration provision; and 2) the standard of review to be employed by a district judge when reviewing a magistrate judge's order on a motion to stay litigation pending the resolution of a parallel arbitration proceeding is under the "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" standard elucidated in Rule 72(a).

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Education

[03/09] Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch.
In an employment discrimination and retaliation action brought by a teacher at a religious school claiming violations of the ADA, the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant based on the "ministerial exception" is vacated and remanded as, given the factual findings relating to plaintiff's primary duties as a teacher, the district court erred in its legal conclusion classifying her as a ministerial employee.

[03/02] Doe v. Kamehamema Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate
In a racial discrimination action against a school district in which plaintiffs, four minor children, sought to proceed anonymously in their suit, dismissal of the action is affirmed where the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow anonymity because the district court did not clearly err in its conclusion that plaintiffs did not reasonably fear severe harm.

[03/01] San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc.
In qui tam plaintiffs' suit seeking to recover funds on behalf of the San Francisco Unified School District under the California False Claims Act (CFCA), trial court's dismissal of the action is reversed as, under the CFCA, a vendor impliedly certifies that it complies with its express contractual requirements when it bills a public agency for providing goods and services, and allegations that the implied certification was false and had a natural tendency to influence the public agency's decision to pay for the goods or services are sufficient to survive a demurrer.

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Family Law

[03/05] People v. Warwick
Conviction of defendant of child abuse and neglect and jury's true finding on the enhancement that she personally inflicted great bodily injury on her child is affirmed as, when she gave birth to her son in her bedroom and concealed the birth causing severe injuries, defendant inflicted great bodily injury on her child.

[03/05] Doe v. S. Carolina Dep't of Soc. Servs.
In a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action brought by a minor child and her adoptive parents against defendant, an Adoption Specialist with the South Carolina Department of Social Services (SCDSS), alleging violations of their substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and state law claims against SCDSS under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA), judgment is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded where: 1) when a state involuntarily removes a child from her home, thereby taking the child into its custody and care, the state has taken an affirmative act to restrain the child's liberty, triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause and imposing "some responsibility for the child's safety and general well being"; 2) because it would not have been apparent to a reasonable social worker in defendant's position that her actions violated the Fourteenth Amendment, she is entitled to qualified immunity; 3) prospective adoptive parents have no substantive due process right to the disclosure of a child's history of sexual abuse; and 4) district court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment on the state law claims for gross negligence against SCDSS is vacated and remanded for consideration of the applicability of section 15-78-60(25).

[03/04] In re E.O.
Juvenile court's denial of a father's request for presumed father status is affirmed as the only provision of Family Code section 7611 that might possibly apply is subdivision (d) which states that a man is a presumed father if he "receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child," and here, the father did not establish that he came within this or any of the categories set forth in Family Code section 7611.

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